An existential and personal reason: apprehension and assent in John Henry Newman
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Abstract
John Henry Newman (1801-1890), who has had an enormous intellectual influence on the development of contemporary Catholic theology, is less known for his contributions to philosophy. By examining his main philosophical work, An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, we attempt to show how the concepts of apprehension and assent reflect a theory of knowledge of an existential and personal nature, in clear confrontation with the prevailing rationalism of his time. Through the examination of these notions, in the complex conceptual framework of the Grammar, we aim to justify that there are many elements by which Newman can be considered fully a philosopher, as he significantly contributes to a personalist epistemology and anthropology.
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