The body-mind problem and disposition in Spinoza´s Ethics
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This article examines the concept of disposition in Spinoza's Ethics as a fundamental contribution to the mind-body problem, offering an alternative to the Cartesian notion of causal interaction. It argues that Spinoza proposes a simultaneity between body and mind, grounded in a direct correspondence between their powers, without implying causal interaction. The study focuses on Proposition 14 of Part Two, where the formula afficitur disponiturque organizes the relationship between bodily affections and the mind’s aptitude. Additionally, it explores the influence of Robert Boyle's mechanism and its impact on Spinoza’s redefinition of the body as an active and relational structure. This approach underscores the significance of the concept of disposition within Spinoza's system and its relevance to contemporary debates in ontology and philosophy of mind.
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