Essences and modal space
Main Article Content
Abstract
This work discusses some difficulties for an actualist modal metaphysics. In particular it considers the question whether the actualist could give a reasonable account of non-actual possible individuals. Several proposals are examined with especial attention to the introduction of individual essences by Plantinga. Plantinga’s essences present several difficulties that are discussed and, finally, resolved. Although it may seem that individual essences are inappropriate for the theoretical task that an actualist metaphysics requires, a more detailed examination shows that the criticism misunderstands the way in which those essences are to be construed. In particular, it is contented here that encaptic properties are the solution to the predicament of the actualist.
Downloads
Article Details
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
The Revista de Filosofía UCSC is an open access journal and does not charge for publication. In addition, it regulates its Copyright and access policy according to the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Public License (CC BY-NC 4.0), therefore sharing (reproducing and distributing the material in any medium or format) and adaptation (modifying, transforming, and creating from the material) is allowed as long as proper credit is given and the citation is included with the corresponding data. Moreover, it is not allowed to use the material for commercial purposes.
References
Allen Hazen (1996), “Actualism Again” Philosophical Studies 84, 155-181.
Alan McMichael (1983), “A Problem for Actualism About Possible Worlds” The
Philosophical Review 92, 49-66.
Alvin Plantinga (2003), Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality, Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
_________________ (1983), “On Existentialism” Philosophical Studies 44, 1-20. Reimpreso
en Plantinga (2003), 158-175. Se cita por esta última versión.
_________________ (1979), “De Essentia” en E. Sosa (ed.), Essays on the Philosophy of
Roderick M. Chisholm, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 101-121. Reimpreso en Plantinga (2003),
-157. Se cita por esta última versión.
_________________ (1976), “Actualism and Possible Worlds” Theoria 42, 139-160.
Reimpreso en Plantinga (2003), 103-121. Se cita por esta última versión.
_________________ (1974), The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
_________________ (1970), “World and Essence” Philosophical Review 79, 461-492.
Reimpreso en Plantinga (2003), 46-71. Se cita por esta última versión.
Andrew Roper (1982), “Towards an Eliminative Reduction of Possible Worlds”
Philosophical Quarterly 32, 45-59.
Brian Syrms (1981), “Tractarian Nominalism” Philosophical Studies 40, 199-206.
David M. Armstrong (1997), A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
________________________ (1989) , A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
________________________ (1978a) ,Universals and Scientific Realism. Volume 1, Nominalism
and Realism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
________________________ (1978b), Universals and Scientific Realism, Volume 2, A Theory of
Universals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
David Lewis (1999), Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
______________ (1986), On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell.
______________ (1983), Collected Papers. Volume 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press