Representation and its shadow

Abstract

The text explores a philosophical critique of representationalism, the idea that perception, thought, and art fundamentally involve representations of reality. The author, inspired by Frege and later developments, rejects this view, arguing that both perception and conceptual activity apply to objects rather than represent them. Initially focusing on the philosophy of mind, this anti-representational stance extends to aesthetics and everyday practices, challenging the modern belief that access to reality always requires representation. The discussion then turns to Kasimir Twardowski’s 1894 theory of representation, which distinguishes between the represented object and the representation itself, using painting as an example. A painting and the landscape it depicts have different ontological statuses: the painting is real, while the “painted landscape” exists only as an intentional object. Drawing on Aristotle’s ontology, the author explains that represented entities possess a specific mode of being—intentional rather than real. This distinction reveals that representation aspires to transparency, concealing its material reality in favor of the ideality of the represented object. Yet, this transparency is constructed, not natural. Ultimately, the text suggests that understanding representation requires acknowledging both its material conditions and its intentional, ideal dimension.