Consciousness and the Question of Self: An African Philosophical Perspective
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African philosophical discourse presents a distinctive perspective on consciousness and selfhood that challenges Western dualistic frameworks. This paper examines how the Bantu concept of vital force (élan vital) provides a foundation for understanding consciousness as relational rather than individually contained. Drawing on Placide Tempels' pioneering work and contemporary African philosophical insights, we explore how consciousness in African thought is conceptualised as a dynamic force that exists on a continuum rather than as an emergent property of complex material arrangements. Through analytical and hermeneutical methods, this paper argues that African concepts of consciousness, particularly when integrated with panpsychist insights, offer a more holistic understanding of selfhood where personal identity emerges through communal relationships rather than isolated introspection. The work concludes that consciousness as vital force provides a culturally grounded alternative to Western individualistic models, positioning the self as fundamentally interconnected with both human and non-human aspects of reality.
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