Is the notion of goodness a priori in Saint Thomas Aquinas' ethics ?
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Moral goodness does not seem to be a notion that could be known through sense experience, however, if it were a priori, in the sense of previous to all sensory experience, it would appear to be empty, and difficult to relate to actions that are morally evaluated. The ethical theory of Aquinas affirms that there is a notion of the moral good, which is the perfection of human nature. The problem of knowing what is morally good persists: Aquinas is emphatic in declaring that sense knowledge is the basis for all other knowledge, but at the same time postulates the existence of principles previous to sense knowledge, even for practical knowledge. In this paper we will look for the relation between what is a priori and sense knowledge of the moral good, in the ethics of Aquinas.
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