What if we cannot see goodness? The "person properties" as an alternative for moral perceptualism.
Article Sidebar
Main Article Content
Abstract
Drawing from philosophy of mind and philosophical ethics, moral perceptualism argues that we can have perceptual experiences of moral properties, such as "good" or "bad," in the same way that we have perceptual experiences of colors and shapes. That is: moral perceptualism argues that we can literally, directly and simply see evil, for example. Despite their wide field of study, these perspectives have met with formidable objections, such as the objection of appearances or Humean criticisms, to which no satisfactory answers have been given. This text aims to argue that many of the problems confronting moral perceptualism are the product of a vague characterization of the moral properties to which perception purportedly applies, and to postulate an alternative type of property that can be both morally relevant and apprehensible by perceptual experience. To this end, so-called person properties are going to be postulated as an alternative option, and their ethical value and relevance for moral perceptualism will be grounded by means of the notion of ethical supervenience. It will be stressed that this route deserves to be explored in virtue of its potential to overcome the usual criticisms of moral perceptualism.
Downloads
Metrics
Article Details
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.
The Revista de Filosofía UCSC is an open access journal and does not charge for publication. In addition, it regulates its Copyright and access policy according to the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International Public License (CC BY-NC 4.0), therefore sharing (reproducing and distributing the material in any medium or format) and adaptation (modifying, transforming, and creating from the material) is allowed as long as proper credit is given and the citation is included with the corresponding data. Moreover, it is not allowed to use the material for commercial purposes.
References
Audi, R. (2015). La percepción moral. Avarigani.
Audi, R. (2017). Moral Perception Defended. Argumenta 1 (1), 5-28
Bergqvist, A., & Cowan, R. (2018). Evaluative perception. Oxford University Press.
Bilbeny, N. (2012). Ética. Ariel.
Bloomfield, P. y Copp, D. (2023). Introduction. En D. Copp y P. Bloomfield, The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism (pp. xi-xx). Oxford University Press.
Changeux, J.-P. (2010). Sobre lo verdadero, lo bello y el bien. Katz
Changeux, J.-P. y Ricoeur, P. (2001). La naturaleza y la norma: Lo que nos hace pensar. Fondo de Cultura Económica
Churchland, P. (2020). El cerebro moral. Paidós
Cowan, R. (2015). Cognitive penetrability and ethical perception. Review of Psychology and Psychology, 6(4), 665–682.
Crane, T. (2021). The Problem of Perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/
Damasio, A. (2018). El error de Descartes. La emoción, la razón y el cerebro humano. Booket
Damasio, A. (2022). Sentir y saber. El camino de la consciencia. Ariel
Drummond, J. & Timmons, M. (2021). Moral Phenomenology. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-phenomenology/
Evers, K. (2013). Neuroética. Cuando la materia se despierta. Katz
Foster, J. y Schroeder, M. (2023). Defining Moral Realism. En D. Copp y P. Bloomfield, The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism (pp. 3-18). Oxford University Press.
Habermas, J. (1985). Ética del discurso. Notas sobre un programa de fundamentación. En J, Habermas, Conciencia moral y acción comunicativa (pp. 53-120). Ediciones Península.
Habermas, J. (1999). Una consideración genealógica acerca del contenido cognitivo de la moral. En J. Habermas, La inclusión del otro (pp. 29-80). Paidós.
Habermas, J. (2002), Corrección normativa versus verdad. El sentido de la validez deontológica de los juicios y normas morales. En J. Habermas, Verdad y justificación (pp. 261-306). Trotta.
Habermas, J. (2018). Del uso pragmático, ético y moral de la razón práctica. En J. Habermas, Aclaraciones a la ética del discurso (pp. 109-126). Trotta.
Harman, G. (1979). The nature of morality: An introduction to ethics. Oxford University Press.
Helton, G. (2018). “Visually Perceiving the Intentions of Others”. En: The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 68, No. 271. (pp. 243–264).
Iacoboni, M. (2009). Las neuronas espejo. Empatía Empatía, Neuropolítica, Autismo, Imitación, o de Cómo Entendemos. Katz
Kalpokas, D. (2008). Pragmatismo, empirismo y representaciones. Una propuesta acerca del papel epistémico de la experiencia. Análisis filosófico XXVIII (2), 281-302
Kalpokas, D. (2009). Acción, percepción e inferencia. Epistemología e historia de la ciencia Vl (15), 266-271
Kalpokas, D. (2017). Percepción y realismo moral. Ética y Discurso. Vol. 2 (2), 31-44.
Kulp, C. (2019). Metaphysics of Morality. Palgrave Macmillan.
Kutschera, F. (1989). Fundamentos de ética. Cátedra.
McBrayer, J. (2010a). A limited defense of moral perception. Philosophical Studies 149 (3), 305–320.
McBrayer, J. (2010b). Moral perception and the causal objection. Ratio, 23 (3), 291–307.
McDowell, J. (1996), Mind and World. Cambridge. Harvard University Press.
McGrath, S. (2004). Moral Knowledge by Perception. Philosophical Perspectives, 18, 209–28.
McLaughlin, B. y Bennett, K. (2018). Supervenience. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/
McNaughton, D. (1988). Moral Vision: An Introduction to Ethics. Basil Blackwell.
McPherson, T. (22 de octubre de 2019). Supervenience in Ethics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience-ethics/
Pacherie, E. (2005). Perceiving intentions. En: J. Sàágua (ed.), A Explicação da Interpretação Humana (pp. 401-414). Colibri.
Prinz, J. (2004). Gut Reaction. A Perceptual Theory of Emotion. Oxford University Press.
Prinz, J. (2007). The Emotional Construction of Morals. Oxford University Press.
Proust, J. (2003). Perceiving intentions. En: J. Roessler y N. Eilan (eds), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology (pp. 296-320). Oxford University Press.
Searle, J. (1979). The Intentionality of Intention and Action. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 22 (1-4), 253 – 280
Searle, J. (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Searle, J. (1992). Intencionalidad. Tecnos.
Searle, J. (1995). La construcción de la realidad social. Paidós.
Searle, J. (2010). Creando el mundo social. La estructura de la civilización humana. Paidós.
Searle, J. (2018). Ver las cosas tal como son. Cátedra.
Sellars, W. (1997). Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Harvard University Press.
Siegel, S. (2006). Which properties are represented in perception? En T. S. Gendler, y J. Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience (pp. 481-503). Oxford University Press.
Siegel, S. (2010). The Contents of Visual Experience. Oxford University Press.
Siegel, S. (2010). Do experiences have content? En B. Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World (pp. 333–368). Oxford University Press.
Siegel, S (2020). Los contenidos de la experiencia visual. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
Siegel, S. (2021). The Contents of Perception. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-contents/
Singer, P. (1995). Ética práctica. Akal.
Singer, P. (2017). Vivir éticamente. Paidós.
Reiland, I. (2014). On Experiencing High-level Properties. American Philosophical Quarterly Volume 51 (3), pp. 177-187.
Reiland, I. (2021). On Experiencing Moral Properties. Synthese, 198, pp. 315-325.
Tooley, M. (1986). Abortion and infanticide. En P. Singer (ed), Applied ethics (pp. 57–86). Oxford University.
Von Hildebrand, D. (2014). La idea de la acción moral. Encuentro
Warren, M. A. (1997). On the moral and legal status of abortion. En H. Lafollette (ed), Ethics in practice: An anthology (pp. 91–102). Blackwell.
Werner, P. J. (2016). Moral perception and the contents of experience. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 13(3), 294–317.
Werner, P. J. (2017). A posteriori ethical intuitionism and the problem of cognitive penetrability. European Journal of Philosophy, 25(4), 1791–1809.
Werner, P. J. (2018). Moral perception without (prior) moral knowledge. Journal of Moral Philosophy, 15 (2), 164–181.https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-46810075
Werner, P. (2020a). Moral perception. Philosophy Compass, 15, 1–12.
Werner, P. J. (2020b) Which Moral Properties Are Eligible for Perceptual Awareness? Journal of moral philosophy 17 (3), 290-319