Naive realism and intentionalism: a middle way in search of an interpretative relationship with the environment
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Abstract
In philosophy of perception the relationship with the environment is the terrain where Naive Realism and Intentionalism are positioned as two opposing positions. The first of these presents an explanation that satisfies the one who seeks an elucidation of the intimate relationship in the presentation of the environment during perception, while the other theory might satisfy those who seek an elucidation of the manner in which the environment presents itself in this or that way to different perceivers, giving room for the formation of particular judgments and beliefs. But can there be an intermediate approach that ensures the intimacy of perceptual presentation and representation of the environment? The following article will set out the elements of the debate by addressing a definition of each theory, then moving towards an intermediate alternative and finally concluding on the possibility of such an intermediate position but with a dynamic representational approach.
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