Insecurity and inhospitability. A phenomenology of dwelling from the experience of fear in Being and Time
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This article develops a phenomenological reading of insecurity (Unsicherheit) as an affective experience of fear, within the framework of the fundamental ontology of Being and Time. Through a hermeneutics of the concrete, it argues that insecurity reveals a structural dimension of everyday living, by manifesting the fragility of the trust that sustains the shared world. Unlike inhospitableness (Unheimlichkeit), which deconstructs the world from a radical ontological plane, insecurity presents itself as a situated form of destabilisation that emerges from within the world. The work reconstructs the structural articulation between insecurity-fear and inhospitableness-anguish and recovers the Aristotelian trace in the understanding of fear as a situated affective disposition. Finally, it concludes that insecurity allows us to rethink inhabiting as a practice sustained by trust, the rupture of which exposes the conditions of possibility of living together, especially in contexts of crisis such as the Covid-19 pandemic.
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References
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