Critiques of the requirement of impartiality in morality and a proposal for reinterpretatio
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"From a synoptic consideration on the modern comprehension of moral impartiality, which I am here calling “abstract”, this work will research the possibility of understanding the notion of impartiality from a different view; to be able, on the one hand, to keep it as a requirement for morality and, furthermore, to save it from multiple criticism to which the notion of impartiality has been subjected through the years (being excessively demanding, repressor of the differences, psychologically unsustainable, unfeasible, etc.). My proposal is to reinterpret impartiality in a manner that I will call “concrete impartiality”, which would imply to give each person what they deserve, for what each person is, (regarding people themselves as well as in their relation with others) and what each person has done.
I will sustain that “concrete impartiality” provides a better fulfillment for the requirement of moral impartiality, instead of the typically modern “abstract impartiality”.
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