The morally good action in the ethics of D. von Hildebrand

Abstract

In the context of Dietrich von Hildebrand’s phenomenological ethics, we inquire about the experiences involved in moral action and the conditions, both formal and material, that make it a morally good or valuable action. In this analysis, we propose that three intentional experiences are present in every human action: the cognitive apprehension of value, the response to value, and the realization of action. We argue that the moral value of an action depends primarily on the volitional response to a special group of values: the morally relevant values. Additionally, we highlight the central role of moral models or examples in the valoric education of individuals and the importance of imitation in their moral development. In contrast to Kantian ethics, we argue that moral development is not just a matter of reason, but also involves emotions and the will. Furthermore, we reflect on the meaning and scope of Hildebrand’s theory on immoral actions, concluding that a formally moral (correct) action may be materially immoral. This is because a morally relevant value may not have been taken into account or may have been intentionally ignored in the volitional response. Overall, we argue that the phenomenological approach to ethics, as exemplified by Hildebrand, offers a valuable perspective on moral action, emphasizing the role of experience, emotion, and volition, as well as the importance of the moral model in guiding moral development.