The phenomenological root of the “belief” concept: brief considerations for a formal study of belief in the thought of Ortega Y Gasset
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Abstract
The concept of "belief" constitutes one of the main ideas within the Orteguian philosophical system. Its relevance lies in its functionality in analyzing human life, from perspectives that range from metaphysics to socio-cultural theorizing. In relation to Ortega's thought, a phenomenon as sensitive and significant as belief requires an analysis of its phenomenological roots and the conceptual evolution that it entails. This approach is also decisive in its understanding, since beyond the prisms from which it is possible to analyze human life, the internal structure of belief enjoys special stability. This paper offers a preliminary framework on the construction of the idea of belief in the genesis of Ortega's thought, a stage where the determinations of Husserl's phenomenology are more evident. All this is done in order to formalize and enhance the study of the concept, to the extent that this root can be identified, even in its mature conception. To fulfill this purpose, a comparative analysis is developed, based on the essential concepts that affect the conception of "consciousness" in Husserl and "belief" in Ortega.
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