The imbrication of the contextual factor and the condition of re-identification as non-conceptualistic motivations
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Abstract
The present essay seeks, mainly, to critically access the question of whether the contents of perceptual experiences are structured and composed from analogous concepts to propositional attitudes such as belief and desire; in order to establish and make two transparent arguments –the importance of the contextual factor and the re-identification condition – that constitute, to a certain way like an obstacle to the conceptualist position. Both arguments propose a problem for the vision that emphasizes that in all cases the content of a perceptual experience necessarily contains concepts that fully specify each of the elements that are available at the conscious level during said experience at the same time, that is, the vision that asserts that the content of perceptual experiences is hopelessly conceptual, and that these concepts are capable of detailing and specifying the properties and objects arranged in perceptual experience.
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