Una crítica husserliana a la teoría kantiana del respeto a la ley como móvil moral

Abstract

It is strange in Kantian ethics to consider a 'moral sentiment'. However, within his philosophy, Kant raises the importance of the sentiment of respect as the only moral motive of the will, considering it a type of pure and superior sentiment. Along with exposing this theory, we present Husserl's criticisms of it, from which relevant considerations for moral philosophy emerge, such as: the impossibility of admitting a 'pure will', that is, free of external determinations; the possibility that the will is motivated by ideal objectivities susceptible to affective valuation and practical realization; the inclusion of sentiments in the area of the a priori and, consequently, a renewed understanding of 'pure reason'. Demonstrating in this way that the desire, the valuation and the sense are completely unified and that far from being irrational, sentiments are filled  with rationality, since in the sphere of sensibility essential laws of aprioristic nature also reign.