Order and disorder of the heart: Schelerian notes on evaluative deceptions
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Abstract
The moral value of our practical life depends on our knowledge of values. Moreover, according to Scheler, the adequate intuition of a fully given value necessarily motivates our will to the realization of that value. But it is rather the case that values of different kinds are given to us in varying degrees of inadequacy. For this reason, we are subject to possible value delusions and, therefore, to the possibility of an ethically bad life. In order to show the forms and sources of a priori identifiable value deception, this article addresses, first, the stratified correlation between values and intentional emotions on the basis of the Schelerian meanings of the concept of ordo amoris; secondly, it considers some “measures of knowledge” in order to distinguish two major types of disorder of the ordo amoris based on different forms of delusions or illusions of feeling, preferring and loving.
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