

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD AND THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH: ANSELM'S ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT IN THE LIGHT OF HEIDEGGER

LA EXISTENCIA DE DIOS Y LA ESENCIA DE LA VERDAD: EL ARGUMENTO ONTOLÓGICO DE SAN ANSELMO A LA LUZ DE HEIDEGGER

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Abstract

In this article I offer a new interpretation of Saint Anselm's ontological argument. My aim is to demonstrate that the significance of this argument goes beyond being in favor of its suitability or of its logical validity. Indeed, I argue that its value can be understood as a result of its *crucial position* within what Heidegger calls *the determination of the essence of truth*. I will begin by explaining that, according to Heidegger, the modern conception of *adaequatio* corresponds to the Copernican Revolution. I will then demonstrate that this allows interpreting Anselm's argument as an argument that opens up the possibility for the occurrence of the Copernican Revolution. I will continue by putting into question this interpretation and suggesting that there is an inherent *ambiguity* in Anselm's argument. I will finally argue that this ambiguity allows placing it within a crucial position within Heidegger's account of the determination of the essence of truth. I will conclude by suggesting that the significance of Anselm's argument resides in constituting a point of departure from which a determination of the essence of truth was going to be *explicitly* assumed in an epoch after its own.

Key words: God, ontological argument, Heidegger, truth, modernity, ambiguity

Resumen

En este artículo ofrezco una nueva interpretación del argumento ontológico de San Anselmo. Mi propósito es demostrar que la importancia de este argumento va más allá de estar a favor de su idoneidad o de su validez lógica. De hecho, sugiero que su valor puede ser entendido como resultado de su *posición crucial* dentro de lo que Heidegger llama *la determinación de la esencia de la verdad*. Comenzaré por explicar que, según Heidegger, la concepción moderna de la *adaequatio* corresponde a la Revolución Copernicana. Luego demostraré que esto permite interpretar el argumento ontológico de Anselmo como un argumento que abre la posibilidad al acontecimiento de la Revolución Copernicana. Continuaré poniendo en cuestión esta interpretación y sugeriré que hay una ambigüedad inherente en el argumento de Anselmo. Finalmente argumentaré que esta ambigüedad permite situarlo dentro de una posición crucial dentro del planteamiento de Heidegger de la determinación de la esencia de la verdad. Concluiré sugiriendo que la importancia del argumento de Anselmo reside en ser un punto de partida desde el cual una determinación de la esencia de la verdad iba a ser *explícitamente* asumida en una época posterior a la suya.

Palabras clave: Dios, argumento ontológico, Heidegger, verdad, modernidad, ambigüedad

1. INTRODUCTION

The ontological argument of God's existence may be traced back to St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109). This argument has been widely discussed and debated ever since Anselm himself expounded his views on the matter in his short treatise *Proslogion seu Alloquium de Dei existentia* (*Proslogion*, or the discourse on the existence of God). As Graham Oppy says, 'there is little about the *Proslogion* that is completely uncontroversial' (1995: 7).

On the one hand, the discussion has systematically revolved around the suitability of providing an ontological argument of God's existence or, what is the same, of providing an *a priori* argument of God's existence. Thus the debate has involved those who support its suitability and those who are against it; a debate that has also meant an evaluation of the logical validity of the argument. On the other hand, the discussion has also dealt with the question whether Anselm's argument can be taken to be a proof of God's existence or not. The discussion has been undeniably significant for Theology and Philosophy since it has been rehearsed within both fields of inquiry. At the same time, the persistence of the debate illustrates the continued relevance and vitality of the argument itself.

In this paper I will not approach Anselm's ontological argument by discussing the suitability of providing an ontological argument of God's existence. This means that I will neither argue for or against its suitability, nor will I address the problem centring on the argument's logical validity. Rather, my treatment of this argument will consist in exploring it in light of Heidegger's account of the essence of truth and its corresponding shifts throughout metaphysics; an analysis that will involve evaluating if Anselm's argument can be taken to be a proof of God's existence or not.

Besides a brief mention of Anselm's argument in *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* (1927)¹, Heidegger does not offer an account of it throughout his works. Because of this, the analysis that I will carry out in this paper takes Anselm's argument to be a case study of Heidegger's view of the shifts in the concept of truth throughout metaphysics. With this, I in no way intend to deny the importance of this argument. On the contrary, my aim is to demonstrate that its significance goes beyond being in favor of its suitability or of its logical validity, and that it is also independent of the decision whether it is an argument that can be taken to be a proof God's existence or not. In fact, I will show that precisely because we cannot take this decision, the value of the argument can be understood as a result of its *crucial position* within what Heidegger calls *the determination of the essence of truth*.

I will begin by explaining that according to Heidegger, the modern conception of *adaequatio* corresponds to the Copernican Revolution. I will then demonstrate

¹ In Chapter One of *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* entitled 'Kant's Thesis: Being Is Not a Real Predicate', Heidegger presents Kant's thesis in direct connection with Anselm's ontological argument. Although he does not offer an analysis of this argument, he refers to it as an ontological proof of God's existence [*der ontologische Gottesbeweis*] (Heidegger 1988: 30/39).

that this allows interpreting Anselm's argument as an argument that opens up the possibility for the occurrence of the Copernican Revolution. I will continue by putting into question this interpretation and suggesting that there is an inherent *ambiguity* in Anselm's argument. I will finally argue that this ambiguity allows placing it within a crucial position within Heidegger's account of the determination of the essence of truth. I will conclude by suggesting that this entails that the significance of Anselm's argument resides in constituting a point of departure from which a determination of the essence of truth was going to be *explicitly* assumed in an epoch after its own.

2. THE MEDIEVAL DUAL CHARACTER OF ADAEQUATIO IN MODERNITY

In *On the Essence of Truth*, Heidegger reflects upon the usual concept of truth, which is soon defined as 'accordance'. Given that this reflection is based on the 'usual' concept of truth, it is clear that what results from it must be the way in which truth is conceived in modernity. Thus, the conception of accordance that Heidegger describes at this point is the conception of accordance within modernity. Here, 'accordance' has to be understood in a double sense: (1) 'the consonance of a matter with what is supposed in advance regarding it' (1998a: 138/179-180)², and (2) 'the accordance of what is meant in the statement, with the matter' (1998a: 138/180). The first sense of 'accordance' corresponds to 'material truth', while the second one to 'propositional truth' (1998a: 138/180). This double sense of 'accordance' is named 'the dual character of the accord':

This dual character of the accord is brought to light by the traditional definition of truth: *veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus*. This can be taken to mean: truth is the correspondence of the matter to knowledge. But it can also be taken as saying: truth is the correspondence of knowledge to matter (Heidegger 1998a: 138/180).

Both directions, (1) the accordance of *matter to knowledge* and (2) the accordance of *knowledge to matter*, are based on the possibility of interpreting the *et* in the formula *adaequatio intellectus et rei*, either in one direction or the other. In the case of interpreting it in the first direction, the formula obtained is: *veritas est adaequatio rei ad intellectum* – truth is the adequation of thing to intellect –, while in the case of interpreting it in the second direction, the formula obtained is: *veritas est adaequatio intellectus ad rem* – truth is the adequation of intellect to thing –. Admittedly, says Heidegger, the traditional definition of truth is usually stated only in this second formula – propositional truth –. 'Yet truth so conceived, propositional truth, is possible only on the basis of material truth, of *adaequatio rei ad intellectum*' (1998a: 138/180). However, both concepts of the essence of *veritas*, says Heidegger, think truth as *correctness* insofar as they both have

² Heidegger's texts will be cited by the English page number, followed by the German.

continually in view a conforming to... (1998a: 138/180).

Nonetheless, and this is a crucial point, each direction is not the simple inversion of the other. The fundamental difference is that in each case *intellectus* and *res* 'are thought differently' (1998a: 138/180). In order to clarify this, Heidegger thinks it necessary to 'trace the usual formula for the ordinary concept of truth back to its most recent (i.e., medieval) origin' (1998a: 138/180). In the medieval context, he says, the first formula – material truth –: *veritas est adaequatio rei ad intellectum*, must not be understood in the Kantian way of 'objects conforming to our knowledge' (1998a: 138/180). Nevertheless, it is undeniable that there is a fundamental connection between the two. I will return to this point later. In the medieval context, *veritas* as *adaequatio rei ad intellectum*:

...implies the Christian theological belief that, with respect to what it is and whether it is, a matter, as created (*ens creatum*), is only insofar as it corresponds to the *idea* preconceived in the *intellectus divinus*, i.e., in the mind of God, and thus measures up to the idea (is correct) and in this sense is "true" (Heidegger 1998a: 138/180).

According to this, in the first formula *rei* is thought as *ens creatum*, and *intellectus* as *intellectus divinus*. The reference of the *ens creatum* to the *intellectus divinus* – its corresponding to the *idea* preconceived in the *intellectus divinus* – is what gives to the *ens creatum* its being and correctness, and in this sense, its truth. But the *intellectus humanus*, Heidegger says, is also an *ens creatum* (1998a: 138/180). With this, we enter into the sphere of the second formula: *veritas est adaequatio intellectus ad rem*.


As a capacity bestowed upon human beings by God, it must satisfy its *idea*. But the understanding measures up to the idea only by accomplishing in its propositions the correspondence of what is thought to the matter, which in its turn must be in conformity with the idea (Heidegger 1998a: 138-139/180).

This means that in the second formula, *intellectus* is *intellectus humanus*, while *rem* continues to be the matter as an *ens creatum*.

This quotation also gives us the basis for understanding the fundamental way in which the first and the second formula of the essence of *veritas* relate to one another. This relation is shown in the way in which the *intellectus humanus* satisfies the *idea* preconceived in the mind of God: the understanding measures up to the idea only by accomplishing in its propositions the correspondence of what is thought to the matter, which – as we saw in the first formula of the essence of *veritas* –, in its turn, must correspond to the *idea* preconceived in the *intellectus divinus*. Thus, human intellect

can only achieve truth in virtue of its relation to the thing as created, since the thing as created connects it with the divine intellect. This means that propositional truth is achieved only on the basis of material truth.

Based on this, we can draw the following scheme (schema I):



(A) and (B) represents the direction of the adequation in each case.

Heidegger points out that because all beings are 'created', the possibility of the truth of human knowledge (*intellectus humanus* satisfying the *idea* in the mind of God – propositional truth –) 'is grounded in the fact that matter and proposition measure up to the idea in the same way and therefore are fitted to each other on the basis of the unity of the divine plan of creation' (1998a: 139/180-181). The measuring up of (1) matter and (2) proposition to the idea in the mind of God 'in the same way', stresses the fact that (1) and (2) suit each other, but it does not mean that material and propositional truth are posited at the same 'level of truth'. In fact, as 'schema I' shows and Heidegger clearly points out: '*veritas as adaequatio rei (creandae) ad intellectum (divinum)* [material truth] guarantees *veritas as adaequatio intellectus humani ad rem (creatam)* [propositional truth]' (1998a: 139/181).

I can now return to the analysis of the way in which *adaequatio* is understood in modernity:

But this order, detached from the notion of creation, can also be represented in a general and indefinite way as a world-order. The theologically conceived order of creation is replaced by the capacity of all objects to be planned by means of a worldly reason that supplies the law for itself and thus also claims that its procedure is immediately intelligible (what is considered “logical”) (Heidegger 1998a: 139/181).

Heidegger thus indicates the way in which *adaequatio* is conceived within a ‘world-order’, which stands apart from the notion of creation and the Creator. With the expression ‘world-order’, Heidegger refers to modernity. This is clear from his definition of this order in terms of ‘the capacity of all objects to be planned by means of a worldly reason’, which means that the planning is now done by humans. The centrality of human beings that this planning involves is for Heidegger the main feature of modernity: ‘Man becomes the referential center of beings as such’ (2002: 67/88). This is made manifest in his definition of the essence of modernity in terms of ‘representation’ (*Vor-stellen*): ‘to bring the present-at-hand before one as something standing over-and-against, to relate it to oneself, the representer, and, in this relation, to force it back to oneself as the norm-giving domain’ (2002: 69/91).

Nevertheless, Heidegger is not interested here in explaining how *adaequatio* is conceived within this ‘world-order’, but in stressing the fact that it has given way to the dominant consideration that the general validity of the formula for the essence of truth (*veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei*) is ‘something immediately evident to everyone’ (1998a: 139/181). Heidegger focuses on questioning the domination of the obviousness that this concept of truth seems to have, in order to look for what makes *adaequatio* itself possible.³ Still, Heidegger makes two statements from which we can work out an understanding of the way in which *adaequatio* is conceived in modernity.

- With respect to ‘material truth’, he argues that within a ‘world-order’ material truth always signifies the consonance of something at hand with the ‘rational’ concept of its essence. ‘The impression arises that this definition of the essence of truth is independent of the interpretation of the essence of the Being of all beings, which always includes a corresponding interpretation of the essence of the human being as the bearer and executor of *intellectus*’ (1998a: 139/181).

³ This reflection takes us to ἀλήθεια (unhidden).


- With respect to 'propositional truth', he argues that within a 'world-order' the essence of propositional truth as the correctness of the statements is thought to need no further proof, which means that correctness is already presupposed as being the essence of truth (1998a: 139/181).

I suggest developing the content of these statements by analyzing 'schema I' not within the context of the 'order of creation', but within a 'world-order'. What happens then?

- The first formula – material truth –, consists now in the consonance of the thing with the 'rational concept of its essence'. Given that Heidegger uses this expression within the context of a 'worldly reason that supplies the law for itself', the word 'rational' is not pointing to an *intellectus divinus*, but to an *intellectus humanus*. The human being is now 'the bearer and executor of the *intellectus*'. In this way, the terms *rei* and *intellectus* change their significance as follows: '*intellectus*' is no longer *intellectus divinus*, but *intellectus humanus*, while '*rei*' continues to be a thing, a matter, but now – given that there is no longer a Creator to whom it is related through creation –, the thing is stripped of its quality of being 'created'.

- The second formula – propositional truth –, preserves the *intellectus* as the *intellectus humanus*, but now the *intellectus humanus* cannot be conceived as an *ens creatum*. Nor can the thing be conceived as an *ens creatum*.

In view of these considerations, 'schema I' has to be drawn in the following way (schema II):




In 'schema II', a circularity regarding the foundation of *veritas* is to occur. The truth of the proposition consists in the conformity of the human intellect to the thing, and the truth of the thing, in its turn, consists in the conformity of the thing to the human intellect. The foundation for truth is thus placed in the human being.

The circularity produced by the placement of the foundation for truth in the human being, evidently involves a transformation of the guarantee that the first formula – material truth – gave to the second formula – propositional truth – in the medieval context. As I already pointed out, in that context the understanding measures up to the idea only by accomplishing in its propositions the correspondence of what is thought to the matter – propositional truth –, which, in its turn, must correspond to the *idea* in the *intellectus divinus* – material truth. This means that God, indirectly, is the final guarantor for truth. Within a 'world-order', by contrast, the guarantee that the truth of the first formula gives to the truth of the second formula, is the human intellect. This, because of its circularity, opens up the possibility for the flattening of 'schema II'.

Considering this, 'schema II' should be drawn as (schema III):

First formula and Second formula:

(material truth and propositional truth)



Direction (A) represents 'material truth' and direction (B) represents 'propositional truth'.

Given that i) 'material truth' now involves the adequation of things to the human intellect, which means that human beings now have the power for determining the essence of things, and ii) 'material truth' is what guarantees the truth of 'propositional truth' and thus plays a more fundamental role in the formula '*veritas est adequatio intellectus humanus et rei*' as a whole, is not 'material truth' the point at which we should make use of our power for determining truth – a power that has been given to us within the 'world-order'? Is not the decision in favor of this act the so-called Copernican Revolution?

We should now return to the point where Heidegger makes a connection between the first formula – material truth – in the medieval context, and Kant. As I have previously pointed out, Heidegger states that in the medieval context, the first formula: *veritas est adaequatio rei ad intellectum* 'does not imply the later transcendental conception of Kant – possible only on the basis of the subjectivity of the human essence – that "objects conform to our knowledge"' (1998a: 138/180), which we understand as the Copernican Revolution. Although this quotation suggests that the first formula is the one that is later understood in the Kantian way of the Copernican Revolution, this is

not entirely clear. However, it becomes clearer if we read the original German version for this quotation:

Die veritas als adaequatio rei ad intellectum meint nicht schon den späteren, erst auf dem Grunde der Subjektivität des Menschenwesens möglichen transzendentalen Gedanken Kants, daß “sich die Gegenstände nach unserer Erkenntnis richten” (Heidegger 1976: 180).

As it can be seen, the English translation ignores the German word ‘schon’. Thus, a more accurate translation should be: ‘*Veritas as adaequatio rei ad intellectum* does not imply yet the later transcendental conception of Kant...’⁴ Considering the word ‘yet’ in this quotation, it is clear that Heidegger thinks that the first formula – material truth – is the one that is later understood in the Kantian way of the Copernican Revolution. If it is the case that it is at the level of material truth that the Copernican Revolution takes place, does this mean that within the ‘order of creation’, the Copernican Revolution would have not been able to occur? In other words, does this mean that the Copernican Revolution and God cannot go together? Given that Heidegger understands the occurrence of the Copernican Revolution at the level of material truth, the analysis offered so far suggests that he would give a positive answer to this question.

But, what about placing the Copernican Revolution in the second formula – propositional truth – in ‘schema I’? In this way, the first formula – material truth – could stay the same, and God could keep the fundamental place that he has within ‘schema I’. Is not this an option for allowing God and the Copernican Revolution to go together?

Given that the adaequation that takes place in the Copernican Revolution is that between human intellect and things, and this condition is fulfilled by the second formula, it seems that there is no problem in placing the Copernican Revolution in this second formula. Nevertheless, we do face a problem when we realize that direction (B) in ‘schema I’ is not the direction that corresponds to the Copernican Revolution. What we would have to do then, is to reverse the direction in (B). Can this reversal take place in ‘schema I’? In other words: within the ‘order of creation’, can we reverse the direction in (B)?

As I have already pointed out, within the ‘order of creation’ it is the intellect that

⁴ I am aware that the usual English translation for the German word ‘schon’ is the word ‘already’. However, it seems to me that in this context the word ‘yet’ is more appropriate. For example, the Spanish translation of this passage renders the word ‘schon’ by the Spanish word ‘todavía’, which is a translation for ‘yet’: La veritas entendida como adaequatio rei ad intellectum no significa todavía lo que más tarde será la idea transcendental de Kant... (Heidegger 2000: 153/180).

one must bring into conformity with the thing, because the thing, as created, is the way through which the human intellect can finally conform to the *idea* in the mind of God, and thus, achieve truth. This means that within the ‘order of creation’, the things, as created, and thus, creation and the Creator, would preclude the reversal of direction (B) in schema I, and so would preclude the possibility of a Copernican Revolution. In contrast to this scenario, within a ‘world-order’, the Copernican Revolution seems not only to be possible, but also necessary, since the foundation of truth is placed in human beings. I do not want to give here a definitive ‘no’ to the possibility of placing the Copernican Revolution in the level of propositional truth, since I am aware that this requires a more extensive study than the one offered here. However, I do think that it is clear that for Heidegger, this ‘no’ would be a definitive one.

According to Heidegger’s analysis of *adaequatio* in *On the Essence of Truth*, in modernity, the medieval version of the first formula (material truth) in the two level structure of *adaequatio*, turns out to be the Kantian formula for the Copernican Revolution. This allows me to suggest that *adaequatio* conceived within a ‘world-order’ should be understood as the modern way of conceiving truth, a way that entails the Copernican Revolution.

3. ANSELM’S ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT SEEN THROUGH HEIDEGGER’S ANALYSIS OF ADAEQUATIO

As Brian Davies points out, ‘Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) claimed that there are only three possible ways of proving the existence of God by means of “speculative reason”. He called one of them “the ontological proof”, and it is often said that this (or “the ontological argument” as it is now commonly called) was first advanced by Anselm in Chapters 2 and 3 of his *Proslogion*’ (2004: 157).

The task of presenting Anselm’s ontological argument in a single and definite way is not an easy one. This is due to the fact that there are a number of ways in which this argument can be reconstructed. In order to preserve a certain line of interpretation, and because I consider it a very clear and fair presentation, I will follow the reconstruction of the arguments in *Proslogion 2* and *3* offered by Brian Davies in his work *Anselm and the ontological argument*.

Davies thinks of *Proslogion* as a work of a committed Christian (2004: 157). Chapter I starts with a plea for divine assistance: ‘Come then, Lord my God, teach my heart where and how to seek You, where and how to find You’ (St. Anselm 1965: 111). Anselm begs for God to reveal Himself to him, since he thinks we cannot find God if God does not help us to do so (Davies 2004: 158). Therefore, says Davies, Chapter I ‘ends with Anselm stating that his aim in what follows is to understand from a position of faith’ (2004: 158): ‘I do not try, Lord, to attain Your lofty heights, because my understanding is in no way equal to it. But I do desire to understand Your truth a little, that truth that my

heart believes and loves. For I do not seek to understand so that I may believe; but I believe so that I may understand. For I believe this also, that 'unless I believe, I shall not understand' (St. Anselm 1965: 115).

However, Davies thinks that despite all that Anselm says about the importance of faith, he 'manifestly thinks that some religious beliefs, including the belief that God exists, can be defended in what we may recognize as a philosophical manner' (2004: 158). With this said, Davies proceeds to expound the arguments in *Proslogion 2* and 3 as follows:

Proslogion 2:

Davies presents two possible ways of reconstructing Anselm's argument in *Proslogion 2*:

A)

1. God is something than which nothing greater can be thought.
2. God exists in the mind since even the Fool can think of (have in mind) something than which nothing greater can be thought.
3. But God cannot just be in the mind since it is greater to be in reality than it is to be only in the mind and since God is something than which nothing greater can be thought (Davies 2004: 160).

B)

1. God is something than which nothing greater can be thought.
2. God exists in the mind since even the Fool can think of (have in mind) something than which nothing greater can be thought.
3. But we can think of something which is greater than something existing only in the mind.
4. So something than which nothing greater can be thought cannot only exist in the mind (Davies 2004: 160).

The difference between these two reconstructions lies in the way the following statement in Latin is translated: '*Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re, quod maius est*' (St. Anselm 1965: 116; 1946: 101). In (A), the translation is: 'For if it is only in the mind it can be thought to be in reality as well, which is greater', while in (B): 'For if it is only in the mind, what is greater can be thought to be in reality' (Davies 2004: 160). While the first translation offers a stronger assertion about reality as greatness – since it establishes a general evaluative contrast between things existing only in the mind and things both in the mind and *in re* –, the second one does not seem to do so. Which translation should we prefer? Although Davies thinks that in *Proslogion 2* Anselm does

not help us to take this decision (2004: 161), he points out that ‘Anselm does seem generally to have believed that being *in re* and greatness somehow go together or imply each other. So *Proslogion 2* may well be asking us to suppose that God cannot be only in the mind since it is greater to be in reality than to be only in the mind’ (2004: 161).

However, in spite of how we translate the Latin statement in question, Davies thinks that the argument given in *Proslogion 2* seems to be valid anyway: ‘This argument begins with something like a definition: “God” is “something which nothing greater can be thought”, and it goes on to state that something than which nothing greater can be thought is in the understanding. Then it introduces the suggestion that something than which nothing greater can be thought is not *in re* (the position of the “Fool”). Anselm’s clear objective is to show that this suggestion cannot be true (his argument is what is known as a *reductio ad absurdum*: it aims to prove that, given certain premises, a particular assertion leads to contradiction and is, therefore, false). And (regardless of how we translate the Latin sentence above-mentioned,⁵ Anselm moves to his conclusion by arguing’ (2004: 168):

- a. If something is *in intellectu* but not *in re*, something greater than it can be thought.
- b. If something than which nothing greater can be thought is *in intellectu* but not also *in re*, then something greater than it can be thought (from (a)).
- c. Something than which nothing greater can be thought is in the understanding but not also in reality.
- d. Something greater than something than which nothing greater can be thought can be thought (contradictory conclusion from (c)) (Davies 2004: 168).

Proslogion 3:

In *Proslogion 3* Anselm states that ‘something than which nothing greater can be thought has to be something which cannot even be *thought* not to exist’ (Davies 2004: 162). As Davies points out, some people have held that *Proslogion 3* presents a separate argument for God’s existence to be distinguished from what we find in *Proslogion 2*. However, Davies considers that in *Proslogion 3* Anselm seems to be supplementing what he has said in *Proslogion 2*. This view is shared by Oppy, who despite the fact that in his book *Ontological arguments and belief in God* presents *Proslogion 2* and *3* as distinct arguments, thinks that as a matter of interpretation, the claim that in *Proslogion 3* Anselm is giving an independent argument for the existence of God, is implausible (1995: 8, 12).

Davies presents Anselm’s argument in *Proslogion 3*, as follows:

1. We can think of something existing which cannot be thought not to exist.
2. Such a thing would be greater than something which can be thought not to exist.

⁵ Davies does not use the comas in the Latin.

3. So something than which nothing greater can be thought cannot be something which can be thought not to exist.

4. So something than which nothing greater can be thought cannot be thought not to exist (Davies 2004: 163).

Having expounded Anselm's argument in *Proslogion* 2 and 3, I will now proceed to evaluate it in terms of my analysis in section I of this paper. In order to do this, I will now hold two assumptions regarding Anselm's ontological argument. However, I will later discuss to what extent it is correct to attribute these assumptions to his *Proslogion*.

Assumption 1: in *Proslogion* 2 and 3, Anselm is attempting to prove the existence of God.

Supporting this assumption, Oppy says that 'some theologians have gone so far as to deny that in it [*Proslogion*] St. Anselm intended to put forward any proofs of the existence of God...since St. Anselm's text can be read as an attempt to prove the existence of God, and since it has been interpreted by many readers in this way ever since it first appeared, I see no reason why I should not read this text in this way' (1995: 7-8).

Assumption 2: Anselm's argument for the existence of God is an argument that is independent of faith, and dependent only on reason.

In his 'Introduction' to *St. Anselm's Proslogion*, M. J. Charlesworth supports this assumption by saying that 'one of the things St. Anselm intended to say was that reason was to some extent capable of understanding God and the things of God prior to faith and independently of faith' (St. Anselm 1965: 40). As I previously mentioned, Davies also thinks that for Anselm, the belief that God exists can be defended in what we may recognize as a philosophical manner. He suggests that '[t]his fact is evident from his *Monologion*, which Anselm offers as a treatise on the existence and essence of God making no appeal to the authority of Scripture. And the *Monologion* and *Proslogion* should be read as complementary works' (2004: 158).


This assumption is particularly important since it allows to classify Anselm's argument as an 'ontological' one. The reason for this is that the distinctive feature of the arguments that are dependent only on reason is that they proceed from premises that are supposed to be known *a priori*, and these arguments were called by Kant 'ontological arguments' (Oppy 1995: 1).

Keeping in mind that the expression 'Anselm's argument' now involves these two assumptions, I will come to the task of approaching this argument through Heidegger's analysis of *adaequatio* in *On the Essence of Truth* by posing the following question: What happens to the structure of 'schema I' when we try to prove God's existence by unaided reason? In other words, does the structure of 'schema I' allow a proof of God's existence by appealing to reason alone? In order to accomplish this analysis I will focus on the guarantor for truth in 'schema I'. The reason for this is that – following the analysis in

section I – in each case the structure of the schema is maintained by its guarantor. This means that any transformation of the guarantor necessarily implies a transformation of the schema.

The proof of God’s existence under consideration here is a proof that is not dependent on faith but only on reason. This means, for example, that (i) we cannot assume that God has placed the concept of himself in our minds in order for us to be able to prove his existence, or that (ii) we cannot appeal to the things that God has created in order to prove his existence. Both of these would imply believing in God’s existence before proving his existence. In the proof under consideration here, I can only place myself in a relationship with the concept of God that is in *my* mind, without any assistance of the mediations that the belief in God’s existence involves. As I already pointed out, the only relationship between the human intellect and God that is established in ‘schema I’, is one mediated through created things. How could we visualize then a proof like this in ‘schema I’?

It seems to me that this can be viewed in the following way (**schema IV**):



In 'schema IV', the human intellect establishes a non-mediated relationship with the divine intellect. Considering that this relationship consists in demonstrating the existence of the divine intellect by the human intellect, what does this mean in terms of the guarantor for truth in 'schemas I and IV'?

Regarding the guarantor for truth in 'schema I', I already pointed out that the truth of the thing as created guarantees that the propositions that the *intellectus humanus* produces at the level of propositional truth accomplishes the conformity with the idea in the mind of God, who thus is the final guarantor for truth. This entails, as I already said, that the structure of 'schema I' is maintained by the guarantee given by God.

According to 'schema IV', the human intellect is now what guarantees the existence of God. This means that in 'schema IV', the human intellect is placing itself as the guarantor for what in 'schema I' is the guarantor for truth – God –, which means that in 'schema IV' the human intellect is placing itself as the final guarantor for truth. As can be seen, structures of 'schema I and IV' are different structures since the guarantor for truth in each case is a different one. This means that the structure of 'schema I' could not allow a proof as the one under consideration here without changing its structure into 'schema IV'.

However, I think that the transformation of 'schema I' into 'schema IV' does not end here; it opens up the possibility for a further transformation. Given that (i) in 'schema II' the human intellect is also the final guarantee for truth (as in 'schema IV'), and that (ii) 'schema II' implies 'schema III' (as I already explained in section I), I think that the transformation of 'schema I' into 'schema IV' opens up the possibility for the transformation of 'schema IV' into 'schema II', and thus, into 'schema III'.

The conclusion of this analysis is that Anselm's argument, understood as a proof of God's existence by unaided reason, opens up the possibility for the occurrence of the Copernican Revolution as understood by Heidegger in his analysis of *adaequatio* in *On the Essence of Truth*.

4. THE INHERENT AMBIGUITY IN ANSELM'S ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

The analysis offered in the previous section of this paper was carried out on the basis of two assumptions regarding Anselm's argument. Without these assumptions, would I have reached to the conclusion that this argument is related to modernity?

- Without assumption 1 we cannot consider Anselm's argument as a proof of the existence of God. The starting point of the analysis carried out in section II is to test what happens to the structure of 'schema I' when proving the existence of God. Thus, if we cannot consider Anselm's argument as a proof of the existence of God, this analysis is precluded from its very beginning. This clearly means that we cannot conclude that

Anselm's argument opens up the possibility for the Copernican Revolution.

- Without assumption 2 we can consider Anselm's argument as an argument that is not only dependent on reason but also on faith. This enables us to believe in God's existence before proving his existence. In this case, the structure of 'schema I' does not change into 'schema IV', since the guarantor for truth continues to be God. This again means that we cannot conclude that Anselm's argument opens up the possibility for the Copernican Revolution.

In light of this, it is clear that the validity of the conclusion reached in section II depends on the appropriateness of attributing these two assumptions to Anselm's argument. Given that I already supported the appropriateness of this attribution, I will now support its inappropriateness so that we can decide which of these two options is correct.

Assumption (1):

- As I already pointed out, Oppy thinks that some theologians have gone so far as to deny that in the *Proslogion*, St. Anselm intended to put forward any proofs of the existence of God. One of these theologians is Karl Barth: 'Barth (1960) is the principal exponent of the view that St. Anselm did not intend to put forward any independent arguments for the existence of God in the *Proslogion*' (Oppy 1995: 207). According to Barth, says Oppy, all that St. Anselm intended to do was to 'expound and impart... the knowledge that is peculiar to faith, knowledge of what is believed from what is believed' (Oppy 1995: 207; Barth 1960: 102). Nevertheless, in his book *Anselm: fides quaerens intellectum*, Barth does use the word 'proof' to refer to what Anselm does in the *Proslogion* (1960: 73). However, this word loses its usual meaning when we notice that for Barth, this 'proof' has to do with making *intelligible* something that is already *given* to us through faith (1960: 78).

- Another interpretation of Anselm's argument which also questions the fact that it can be understood as a 'proof' or even as an 'argument' for the existence of God, is offered by the theologian Paul Tillich: 'The arguments for the existence of God neither are arguments nor are they proof of the existence of God' (1978: 205). The reason for this, says Tillich, is that 'both the concept of existence and the method of arguing to a conclusion are inadequate for the idea of God' (1978: 204). In the first case, to say that God exists is to deny him: 'God does not exist. He is being-itself beyond essence and existence' (1978: 205). In the second case, God is derived from the world, which means that 'God is 'world', a missing part of that from which he is derived in terms of conclusions. This contradicts the idea of God as thoroughly as does the concept of existence' (1978: 205). What are the arguments for the existence of God then? Tillich's answer reads as follows: 'They are expressions of the *question* of God which is implied in human finitude. This question is their truth; every answer they give is untrue' (1978: 205). This means that the arguments must be treated as questions, not as answers: 'they must be deprived from their argumentative character' (1978: 206). The possibility of

this question is given by the fact that ‘an awareness of God is present in the question of God. This awareness precedes the question. It is not the result of the argument but its presupposition. This certainly means that the “argument” is no argument at all’ (1978: 206).

Assumption (2):

- Following Barth’s interpretation of Anselm’s argument above-mentioned, it is to be expected that he also supports the inappropriateness of assumption (2). Barth sustains that ‘The Existence of God’ (1960: 78) and the ‘Nature of God’ (1960: 80) are both accepted in faith. For him, Anselm’s formula *aliquid quo nihil maius cogitari possit* does not say anything about the existence or about the nature of the object described (1960: 75). Thus, it is not ‘the condensed formula of a doctrine of God that is capable of later expansion but it is a genuine description (*significatio*), one Name of God, selected from among the various *revealed* Names of God for this occasion and for this particular purpose, in such a way that to reach a knowledge of God the *revelation* of this same God from some other source is clearly assumed’ (1960: 75). The only thing that Barth thinks that ‘can possibly be expected from this Name [the Name of God] is that, in conformity with the programme of Anselm’s theology, it should demonstrate that between the Name of God and the revelation of his Existence and Nature from the other source there exists a strong and discernible connection’ (1960: 75-76). In light of this, Barth would not only say that faith is something on which Anselm’s *Proslogion* can depend on, but something on which it must depend.

- In his book *A History of Christian Thought*, Paul Tillich offers a different argument in favor of this same idea. Tillich begins his analysis by stating that ‘the basis of Anselm’s theological work was the same as for all the scholastics, the assertion that in the Holy Scriptures and their interpretation by the fathers all truth is directly enclosed. His phrase *credo ut intelligam* (I believe *in order* to understand, not I understand *in order to believe*) must be understood in the light of how he understood faith and tradition. Faith is not belief as a special act of an individual, but is participation in the living tradition. This living tradition, the spiritual substance in which one lives, is the foundation, and theology is interpretation built on this foundation’ (1968: 158). According to this tradition, says Tillich, we grasp the content of eternal truth by the subjection of our will to the Christian message and the consequent experience that arises from this subjection. This experience is given by grace – which means that it has to be distinguished from what we now mean by ‘experience’ –, and every theologian must participate in it (1968: 158). ‘Then this experience can become knowledge, but not necessarily so. Faith is not dependent on knowledge, but knowledge is dependent on faith’ (1968: 158). Having determined the frame within which Anselm’s work has to be placed, Tillich then defines Anselm’s ‘attitude as theonomous’ (1968: 160). What this word means can only be understood within the frame that Tillich has just pointed out: ‘This theonomous way means acknowledging the mystery of being, but not believing that this mystery is an authoritarian transcendent element which is imposed upon us

against us, which breaks our reason to pieces. For this would mean that God would be breaking his Logos to pieces, which is the depth of all reason. Reason and mystery belong together, like substance and form' (1968: 160). In this way, that Anselm attitude was theonomous means that he was neither autonomous in an empty formalistic sense, nor heteronomous in subjecting his reason to a tradition which he did not understand. (1968: 160). Tillich continues to suggest that this theonomous thought is expressed in his famous arguments for the existence of God or, as Tillich likes to say, his so-called arguments for the so-called existence of God, because 'they are neither "arguments" nor do they prove the "existence" of God' (1968: 161). In light of this, Tillich would say that Anselm's *Proslogion* has to be understood as a work that expresses, and is dependent on, the fundamental relation between reason and faith.

Given that both Barth and Tillich are against assumptions (1) and (2), one could expect that there is a necessary connection between criticizing both assumptions. However, this is not the case:

- In her work *Anselm on faith and reason*, Marilyn McCord Adams understands Anselm's *Proslogion* as a proof of the existence of God (2004: 48) and, at the same time, she supports the idea that *Proslogion* has to be understood in terms of collaboration between God and humans: 'Anselm envisions the human search for God as throughout, in all its dimensions and phases, a matter of divine-human collaboration, involving initiative on both sides' (2004: 36). For McCord Adams, God always makes the first move. In *the intellectual sphere* 'God takes the initiative: first, by creating rational beings with intimate knowledge of Himself; then, by disclosing Himself to select human beings, and by providing Holy Scripture and ecumenical Church councils. God sends the Holy Spirit to His people in every age, stands ready to help them understand the mysteries a little bit (*aliquatenus*) more. Yet, as with Moses and the burning bush, the creature must turn aside to pay attention, give him/herself over to sustained inquiry; the Christian ought to accept by asking divine aid and energetically seek to understand what s/he has believed' (2004: 37). This collaborative nature of *intellectual inquiry*, says McCord Adams, 'is fully explicit in his [Anselm's] most famous work, the *Proslogion*' (2004: 37). In this work, 'the soul begins by asking of, putting puzzles to, and/or begging help from God. Then, God "illumines" the soul so that it may "see", "teaches" that it may understand. Anselm appeals, "Tell your servant within, in his heart" that he may know. It then belongs to the soul to articulate what God has revealed...' (2004: 38).

As it can be seen, by supporting the inappropriateness of the attribution of these two assumptions to Anselm's argument, the conclusion reached in section II is invalidated, which means that the argument is kept in its medieval context.

Having explained some views that support both the appropriateness and the inappropriateness of the attribution of these assumptions to Anselm's argument, we should now be in a position to decide which of these two alternatives accurately adheres to this argument. Do we find in the *Proslogion* a clear basis in order to take this decision? I think not.

What I want to suggest is that Anselm's argument provides a basis for taking this decision in favor of both alternatives. With this, I am suggesting that none of the alternatives is completely wrong or none completely right. What does this mean?

In *Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals*, Iris Murdoch offers an analysis of the ontological argument. Here, she says about Anselm's argument that 'its ambiguities give rise to a variety of styles of interpretation' (1992: 392)⁶. By referring to Anselm's argument by the word 'ambiguous', Murdoch highlights a feature that I think is fundamental to it. Because the argument is ambiguous, it does not give us a clear basis for taking a definitive decision regarding its interpretation. Am I stating with this that the argument is not a sound argument? That it is a merely confusing argument and therefore it has not to be taken seriously? No.

In what follows, I want to show that defining Anselm's argument as 'ambiguous' has nothing to do with qualifying it as a valid or invalid argument, but with placing it in a *crucial position* within what Heidegger calls *the determination of the essence of truth*. In this context, the word 'ambiguous' does not touch on the issue of the soundness of the argument, but on something else.

5. ANSELM'S ARGUMENT AND HEIDEGGER'S ANALYSIS OF THE AMBIGUITY IN THE DETERMINATION OF THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH IN PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF TRUTH.

The words with which Heidegger opens his work *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* are the following:

The knowledge that comes from the sciences usually is expressed in propositions and is laid before us in the form of conclusions that we can grasp and put to use. But the "doctrine" of a thinker is that which, within what is said, remains unsaid [*Ungesagte*], that to which we are exposed so that we might expend ourselves on it (Heidegger 1998b: 155/203).

For Heidegger, what remains *unsaid* in Plato's thinking is 'a change in what determines the essence of truth' (1998b: 155/203). He suggests that we can achieve clarity about (i) the fact that this change takes place, (ii) what it consists in, and (iii) what gets grounded through this transformation of the essence of truth, by an interpretation of the 'allegory

6 C.F.J. Williams also holds that Anselm's argument is ambiguous, but he is more specific than Murdoch in that he identifies the precise part of the argument that gives rise to this ambiguity. According to Williams, and following Russell's terms, in *Proslogion* 3 Anselm wanted to prove (1) the primary occurrence that there is just one thing that is X and whose non-existence is inconceivable. However, what he actually proves is (2) the secondary occurrence that is not the case that there is just one thing that is X whose non-existence is conceivable, which is not a proof that there is such a thing (1992: 499). In response to this ambiguity charge, Ian Logan argues that Williams is wrong in this view given that (1) is precisely what Anselm does in *Proslogion* 2 and the remainder of the *Proslogion*. For Logan, the argument in *Proslogion* 3 is not a separate argument containing an unjustified claim about the existence of X (2016: 184).

of the cave' (1998b: 155/203).

For the sake of the clarity of the exposition, I divided Heidegger's analysis of the 'allegory' into four major parts. Parts 'one and two' prepare the ground for parts 'three and four', which contain Heidegger's central ideas regarding the change in the determination of the essence of truth. Thus, I will discuss more extensively the latter parts and address the former ones only marginally.

Part one: Heidegger argues that the 'allegory' is meant to talk about *παιδεία* (education): the 'turning around' of the soul towards that which is 'more truth'. But, since there is an essential relation between *παιδεία* and *ἀλήθεια* (unhidden), a proper understanding of the content of the 'allegory' is only achieved by also focusing on *ἀλήθεια* (1998b: 167-168/218-219). This essential relation is entirely explained in part two.

Part two: Heidegger offers two crucial descriptions of *ἀλήθεια* according to its Greek essence: (1) in some way or other it renders accessible whatever appears and keeps it revealed in its appearing, and (2) it also constantly overcomes a hiddenness of the hidden: the unhidden (*Unverborgen*) must in a sense be stolen from hiddenness (1998b: 171/223). Between the exposition of descriptions (1) and (2), the essential relation between *παιδεία* and *ἀλήθεια* mentioned in part one is explained: being oriented toward that which is the 'most unhidden' alone fulfills the essence of education – *παιδεία* – as a turning around.

Part three: According to Heidegger, the 'allegory', and specially the image of an underground cave, has no basis as an illustration if we do not understand *ἀλήθεια* in its original Greek sense. Nevertheless, in place of *ἀλήθεια*, another essence of truth pushes to the fore:

And yet, even though *ἀλήθεια* is properly experienced in the "allegory of the cave" and is mentioned in it at important points, nonetheless in place of unhiddenness another essence of truth pushes to the fore. However, this also implies that unhiddenness still maintains a certain priority (Heidegger 1998b: 172/224).

Heidegger thinks that since 'the expository power behind the images of the "allegory" is concentrated on the role played by the fire, the fire's glow and the shadows it casts, the brightness of day, [and] the sunlight and the sun' (1998b: 172/225), unhiddenness is only considered in terms of 'how it makes whatever appears be accessible in its visible form (*εἶδος*), and in terms of how it makes this visible form, as that which shows itself (*ιδέα*), be visible' (1998b: 172-173/225). Thus, the reflection is focused on the visible form that offers a view of what is present, i.e., the *ιδέα*. The idea is what brings about presencing of what a being is (its whatness) in any given instance.

What the idea, in its shining forth, brings into view and thereby let us see, is – for the gaze focused in that idea – the

unhidden of that as which the idea appears. This unhidden is grasped antecedently and by itself as that which is apprehended in apprehending the *ιδέα* [*Vernehmen der idea Vernommene*], as that which is known (*γινώσκειν*) in the act of knowing (*γινώσκόμενον*). Only in this Platonic revolution do *νοεῖν* and *νοῦς* (apprehending) first get referred essentially to the “idea”. The adoption of this reorientation to the ideas henceforth determines the essence of apprehension [*Vernehmung*] and subsequently the essence of “reason” (Heidegger 1998b: 173/225-226).

This means for Heidegger that now unhiddenness is accessible thanks to the idea’s ability to shine and that this access is necessarily carried out through ‘seeing’. Thus, unhiddenness ‘is yoked into a relation with seeing’ (1998b: 173/226); it is relative to seeing. Heidegger continues by pointing out that the relation between the ‘thing seen’ and the ‘act of seeing’ is possible by the light that lends visibility to all things: the sun. But, seeing sees what is visible only insofar as the eye has ‘the power to participate in the sun’s kind of essence, that is, its shining’ (1998b: 173/226). For him, Plato expresses this relationship as follows: ‘Thus what provides unhiddenness to the thing known and also gives the power (of knowing) to the knower, this, I say, is the idea of the good’ (Plato in Heidegger 1998b: 173-174/226).

Part four: Heidegger’s interpretation of the ‘allegory’ in terms of a transformation in the essence of truth, follows from what he has said in part three:

...this allegory contains Plato’s doctrine of truth, for the allegory is grounded in the unspoken event whereby *ιδέα* gains dominance over *ἀλήθεια*. The “allegory” puts into images what Plato says about *ιδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, namely, that *αὐτὴ κυρία ἀλήθεια καὶ νοῦν παρασχομένη*, “she herself is mistress in that she bestows unhiddenness (on what shows itself) and at the same time imparts apprehension [*Vernehmen*] (of what is unhidden)”. *Αλήθεια* comes under the yoke of *ιδέα* (Heidegger 1998b: 176/230).

Heidegger suggests that when Plato considers the *ιδέα* as the mistress that allows unhiddenness, ‘he points to something unsaid’ (1998b: 176/230), namely, that from now on the essence of truth, as the essence of unhiddenness, does not ‘unfold from its proper and essential fullness but rather shifts to the essence of the *ιδέα*’ (1998b: 176/230). This means for him that ‘truth gives up its fundamental trait of unhiddenness’ (1998b: 176/230). By the shifting to the essence of *ιδέα*, our comportment with beings becomes a matter of seeing – *ιδεῖν* – the visible form – *ιδέα* –, which requires the correct vision. Heidegger thinks this is clear in Plato’s following words: ‘and thus turned to what is more in being, they should certainly see more correctly’ (Plato in Heidegger 1998b: 177/230). According to Heidegger, Plato is here talking about those who, once liberated, turn away from the shadows toward the things, and thus, direct their gaze to

that which is ‘more in being’ (in comparison with the shadows). Now, says Heidegger, ‘the movement of passage from one place to the other consists in the process whereby the gaze becomes more correct...Thus, the priority of *ιδέα* and *ιδεῖν* over *ἀλήθεια* results in a transformation in the essence of truth. Truth becomes *ὀρθότης*, the correctness of apprehending and asserting’ (1998b: 177/230-231). This implies that the locus of truth also changes: truth is no longer a fundamental trait of beings themselves, but – as the correctness of the ‘gaze’ – it becomes a characteristic of human comportment toward beings (1998b: 177/231).

At this point Heidegger introduces the idea of an ambiguity in Plato’s doctrine of truth: On the one hand, Plato still has to hold on to truth as a fundamental characteristic of beings, since being – as something present – has being precisely by appearing; being brings unhiddenness with it. But on the other, ‘the inquiry into what is unhidden shifts in the direction of the appearing of the visible form, and consequently towards the act of seeing that is ordered to this visible form, and toward what is correct and toward the correctness of seeing’ (1998b: 177/231).

This is precisely what attests to the heretofore unsaid but now sayable change in the essence of truth. The ambiguity [*Zweideutigkeit*] is quite clearly manifested in the fact that whereas *ἀλήθεια* is what is named and discussed, it is *ὀρθότης* that is meant and that is posited as normative – and all this in a single train of thought (Heidegger 1998b: 177/231).

This means for Heidegger that in Plato’s allegory, ‘truth still is, at one and the same time, unhiddenness and correctness, although unhiddenness already stands under the yoke of the *ιδέα*’ (1998b: 178/232).

Heidegger suggests that this ambiguity can also be found in Aristotle. On the one hand, he thinks that in the concluding chapter of Book IX of the *Metaphysics*, ‘unhiddenness is the all-controlling fundamental trait of beings’ (1998b: 178/232). On the other, he thinks that insofar as Aristotle says that ‘the false and the true are not in things (themselves)...but in the intellect’ (Aristotle in Heidegger 1998b: 178/232), the place of truth and falsehood and of the difference between them is now the assertion of a judgment made by the intellect:

The assertion is called true insofar as it conforms to the state of affairs and thus is a *ὁμοίωσις*. This determination of the essence of truth no longer contains an appeal to *ἀλήθεια* in the sense of unhiddenness; on the contrary *ἀλήθεια*, now taken as the opposite of *ψεύδος* (i.e., of the false in the sense of the incorrect), is thought of as correctness. From now on this characterization of the essence of truth as the correctness of both representation and assertion becomes normative for the whole of Western thinking (Heidegger 1998b: 178/232).

For Heidegger, the guiding theses that typify the characterizations of the essence of truth in the main epochs of metaphysics, evidence this normative character of the essence of truth as correctness:

- Medieval Scholasticism: Thomas Aquinas.
- The beginning of modern times: Descartes.
- The age when the modern era enters its fulfillment: Nietzsche.

In line with the analysis so far, it is relevant to mention Heidegger's reference to Aquinas' and Descartes' theses:

- Aquinas says: 'Truth is properly encountered in the human or in the divine intellect' (Aquinas in Heidegger 1998b: 178/233). Thus, the essential locus of truth is the intellect. Here, says Heidegger, truth is no longer *aletheia* but *omoiosis – adaequatio* –.
- Descartes says: 'Truth or falsehood in the proper sense can be nowhere else but in the intellect alone' (Descartes in Heidegger 1998b: 179/233).

Heidegger suggests that this interpretation of beings results in that 'being present is no longer what it was in the beginning of Western thinking: the emergence of the hidden into the unhiddenness, where unhiddenness itself, as revealing, constitutes the fundamental trait of being present' (1998b: 179/233-234). By the determination of the being of beings as *ιδέα*, truth has become correctness.

In light of this, I want to suggest that an interpretation of Anselm's argument in *Proslogion* in light of Heidegger's analysis of Plato's allegory of the cave in *The Republic*, allows understanding the ambiguity of this argument as an expression of the coexistence of two ways of experiencing truth. These are the *medieval* experience of truth and the *modern* experience of truth.

If we accept that it is in Anselm's argument where this ambiguity first takes place, then – following Heidegger's analysis – we would have to place this argument in a crucial position within the determination of the essence of truth. This crucial position consists in being the work in which the change that goes from 'truth as correctness as experienced in Aquinas' to 'truth as correctness as experienced in Descartes' first takes place.

As can be seen, this is a change that takes place within the already prevailing determination of the essence of truth as correctness. Thus, it does not correspond to the main change of the determination of the essence of truth (which takes place in Plato's allegory and goes from *aletheia* to correctness), but to a secondary one.

Despite this differentiation, I think that following Heidegger's analysis, both 'Plato's allegory' and 'Anselm's argument' can be interpreted as preparing the ground for a

determination of the essence truth that was going to be distinctive of the epoch after their own.

6. CONCLUSION

In this paper I have explored Anselm's ontological argument in light of 1) Heidegger's analysis of *adaequatio* in *On the Essence of Truth*, and 2) Heidegger's analysis of the *ambiguity* in the determination of the essence of truth in *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*. The aim of this paper was to demonstrate that the significance of Anselm's argument goes beyond being in favor of its suitability or of its logical validity. I suggested to do this by arguing that its value can be understood as a result of its *crucial position* within what Heidegger calls the *determination of the essence of truth*.

The analysis was developed in four central steps, each one corresponding to a section of this paper. Throughout this analysis the concept of an *ambiguity* in the determination of the essence of truth appeared to be decisive for accomplishing the aim of this paper. I defined Anselm's argument as 'ambiguous' by showing that the argument itself provides a basis upon which two differing interpretations may be advanced:

- 1) Anselm's argument is related to the occurrence of modernity; and
- 2) Anselm's argument is entirely consistent with its medieval context.

Each interpretation is the conclusion of a corresponding analysis carried out in this paper. Each analysis was developed on the basis of certain ideas. Thus, the validity of each analysis and its respective conclusion –interpretations (1) and (2) - is dependent on these ideas:

- Interpretation (1) was developed in section II, on the basis of:

- a) Heidegger's analysis of *adaequatio* in *On the Essence of Truth* (explained in section I).
- b) Two assumptions regarding Anselm's argument:
 - i) In Proslogion 2 and 3, Anselm attempts to prove the existence of God.
 - ii) Anselm's proof of the existence of God is a proof that is independent of faith, and dependent only on reason.

- Interpretation (2) was developed in section III, on the basis of:

- a) The negation of assumptions i) and ii)

The main characteristic of interpretation (1) is that it directs Anselm's argument

away from its theological scheme, while interpretation (2) does precisely the opposite. Whereas according to interpretation (1) Anselm's argument can be considered as a 'rational' 'proof' of the existence of God, interpretation (2) thinks it inappropriate to attribute these adjectives to this argument.

Once the argument was defined as 'ambiguous', this word acquired a fundamental significance through Heidegger's analysis of the ambiguity in the determination of the essence of truth in *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*.

Following this analysis, I interpreted the ambiguity in Anselm's argument as an expression of the coexistence of two ways of experiencing truth: 1) the medieval experience of truth as correctness as experienced in Aquinas' thesis and 2) the modern experience of truth as correctness as experienced in Descartes' thesis. Further, I argued that if we accept that it is in Anselm's argument where this ambiguity first arose, then this argument has to be placed within a crucial position within the determination of the essence of truth. This crucial position consists in being the work in which the change that goes from 1) truth as correctness as experienced in Aquinas to 2) truth as correctness as experienced in Descartes, first took place.

In light of this, I want to suggest that the significance of Anselm's argument resides in constituting a point of departure from which a determination of the essence of truth was going to be *explicitly* assumed in an epoch after its own.

Finally, I would like to point out that Heidegger's analysis of *Plato's Doctrine of Truth* defines the change in the determination of the essence of truth in 'Plato's allegory' as something *unsaid*. Although in this paper I have not developed Heidegger's concept of 'the unsaid', I think that the application of this concept to the change that takes place in Anselm's argument would entail at least two relevant implications for the analysis carried out in this paper. First; as an *unsaid* change, Anselm cannot be considered as being aware of its occurrence. Second; the continued relevance and vitality of the argument can be attributed to its *unsaid*.

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